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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a Parisian woman who collects handbags designed by
Longchamp. If and when this woman travels to the United States, she
will likely expect any product emblazoned with the Longchamp horse
logo to originate from a similar source as the handbags she has
previously purchased in France. However, the present structure of U.S.
trademark law under the Lanham Act does not assure our consumer that
the Longchamp horse logo found on a product in the United States will
be of the same quality as the products from Longchamp with which she
was familiar in France.
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Currently, there is no explicit protection in the Lanham Act for
marks that are famous, yet not actually used, in the United States.1 Thus,
there is no guarantee for a consumer visiting the United States from
abroad that a product bearing the same trademark as one back home
originates from the same source and is therefore of similar quality as the
product to which the foreign consumer is accustomed.
For over 60 years, the Lanham Act2 has governed trademark
protection in the United States. Congress promulgated the Lanham Act to
encourage fair competition, efficiently allocate resources, and provide
incentives for trademark-holders to improve product quality.3
Historically, U.S. law has provided protection to only those trademarks
actually used in the United States.4 However, as a result of increased
outsourcing and globalization of trade, trademarks from even the most
remote areas of the globe regularly surface in the consciousness of U.S.
consumers.5 U.S. courts have struggled to deal with the rise of
trademarks that are famous and recognized by domestic consumers, yet
fail to meet the “use in commerce” element required to provide
protection under the Lanham Act.6 One approach, adopted by the Ninth
Circuit, grants priority in limited circumstances to trademarks that are
famous and recognized by consumers in a particular market but are not
“actually used” in that market under the requirements set forth in the
Lanham Act.7 In contrast, the Second Circuit has hesitated to grant
protection to trademarks that do not meet the “actual use” standard.8 The
1
The Lanham Act requires “use[] in commerce” to establish a claim for civil
liability. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006).
2
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (2006). The Lanham Act is the popular name for the
Trademark Act of 1946.
3
Elizabeth M. Flanagan, No Free Parking: Obtaining Relief from Trademark–
Infringing Domain Name Parking, 92 MINN. L. REV. 498, 509 (2007). See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (2006) (The intent of this Act is to . . . protect persons engaged in such commerce
against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce . . . and to
provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks,
trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign
nations). See also 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, §§ 2:1–5 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter “MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS”].
4
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
5
Frederick W. Mostert, Famous and Well-Known Marks: an International Analysis
1–2 (Butterworths 1997).
6
15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a)(1), 1127. The power of Congress to enact the Lanham Act is
derived from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 3.;
Bonder, Moshe H., Patent and Lanham Acts: Serving Two Legitimate Purposes or
Providing an Indefinite Monopoly?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 11 (2004). Under the
Lanham Act, “use in commerce” means “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary
course of trade.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
7
See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
8
See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007).
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Second Circuit strictly applies the territoriality principle, which provides
that trademarks registered in a foreign country have no priority of right
over trademarks used domestically, regardless of the degree to which
domestic consumers recognize the trademark (i.e. the degree of fame
inherent in the trademark).9
The scope of what constitutes a famous mark, defined in the
Lanham Act as a mark that is “widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the
goods or services of the mark’s owner,”10 has not been clearly interpreted
by the federal circuit courts of appeals.11 Part I of this Comment will
discuss the difficulties encountered in defining a famous foreign mark.
Part I will also discuss the overarching principles of territoriality12 and
universality13 used to determine the type of “use” sufficient to warrant
trademark protection. International law has addressed the famous marks
issue in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (the “Paris Convention”).14 Article 6bis provides an
exception to the territoriality principle by allowing protection of a
famous or well-known trademark even when such trademark has not
been “use[d] in commerce”15 in the country in question.16 This Comment
urges Congress to incorporate Article 6bis into the Lanham Act because
protecting well-known and famous marks of other countries brought into
the United States will encourage foreign producers to enter the U.S.
9

See generally id.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
11
It should be noted that most jurisdictions draw a distinction between “famous” and
“well-known” marks. Typically, the former type of mark warrants a higher degree of
reputation and protection. See MOSTERT, supra note 5, at 21. For purposes of this
Comment, the terms “famous” and “well-known” will be used interchangeably because
the myriad of definitions attributed to these terms in the literature do not permit a clear
definition for either term. See also INT’L TRADEMARKS ASS’N, FAMOUS AND WELLKNOWN MARKS (April 3, 1995), http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=com_content&
task=view&id=1721&Itemid=59&getcontent=1 (last visited December 29, 2008).
12
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “territoriality” as “[t]he principle that a nation has
the right of sovereignty within its borders.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1512 (8th ed.
2004).
13
Universality is also referred to as “national treatment,” or the “policy or practice of
a country that accords the citizens of other countries the same intellectual-property
protection as it gives its own citizens, with no formal treaty of reciprocity required.” This
principle formed the foundation for the first international intellectual-property treaties of
the nineteenth century, including the Paris Convention. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1054
(8th ed. 2004).
14
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6bis, March 20,
1883, last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 53 Stat. 1748, 828 U.N.T.S. 305
[hereinafter Paris Convention].
15
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
16
Paris Convention, supra note 14.
10
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market for the sale of their goods. Such protection will expand consumer
choice and, ultimately, reduce consumer search costs.17
Part II will address the theory of consumer search costs as an
overall justification for trademark law and the effects of increased
consumer search costs on economic efficiency. Reduction of consumer
search costs has long been considered a principal aim of trademark law.18
This central goal must remain at the heart of any and all policy-making
as the law of trademarks continues to evolve.19
Part III will outline the current circuit split on the Famous Foreign
Marks Doctrine.20 In ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., the Second Circuit
firmly rejected the application of any exception to the territoriality
principle for famous marks.21 The Second Circuit found that Congress
had intentionally excluded protection for famous but unused marks from
the scope of the Lanham Act and that, absent any further explanation
from Congress on the issue, the Second Circuit would continue to
disregard the theory of a Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine.22 In contrast,
and in contravention of the territoriality principle, the Ninth Circuit, in
Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., permitted protection of
famous foreign marks on policy grounds.23 The Ninth Circuit found that
the territoriality principle should not be absolute and that, when equity
demanded, exceptions to the territoriality rule should be made for marks
that are famous and well-known within the relevant market in question.24
17

General economic theory divides the total cost of a good into two components: (1)
price of the good or service (“price”) and (2) costs incurred by the consumer to gather
information about the good or service and its vendor, including the transaction costs of
inspection and negotiation (“search costs”). Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken:
Initial Interest Confusion, Search Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 SEATTLE L.
R. 97, 109 (2004). William Landes and Richard Posner engineered a model representing
the dual costs incurred in any purchase of a good or service. This model defined the full
price of a good (π) as the sum of the money price of the good (P) and the search costs
incurred by a consumer in obtaining information about the relevant attributes of the good
(H). The strength of a trademark reduces the value of the search cost component (H);
therefore, a product with a strong trademark has lower search costs (H) than a product
with a weak trademark (or none at all). William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1987). For further
discussion of search costs, see infra Part II.
18
Landes & Posner, supra note 17.
19
Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 762 (1990).
20
The “Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine” provides an exception to the principle of
territoriality for famous and well-known marks that protects a mark that is well-known,
but has not been actually used, in the U.S. market. Vaudable v. Monmartre, Inc., 193
N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
21
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 163–65 (2d Cir. 2007).
22
Id.
23
Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
24
Id. at 1094.
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Part IV will discuss the positive effects that adoption of a
territoriality exception for famous marks in the United States would have
on consumer search costs and overall economic efficiency. Protecting
famous foreign marks will allow a consumer to confidently rely on
purchases of goods she made previously, regardless of whether such
prior purchases occurred in the United States or in a foreign country.
This Comment proposes that because of the importance of reducing
a consumer’s search costs, maintaining economic efficiency, and
preserving the goals of trademark law, Congress should amend the
Lanham Act to expressly recognize the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine.
This recognition may be accomplished by incorporating, by reference,
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention25 into the Lanham Act. Due to the
rise in trafficking of goods through Internet marketing and sales, as well
as the increase in international travel for both business and personal
purposes, there is currently a greater need for Congress to address this
issue than ever before.
PART I: DEFINING FAMOUS FOREIGN MARKS
This Part will discuss the principles of territoriality and universality
as justifications for trademark law, and will address the small (but
growing) body of scholars and judges who seek to apply an exception to
territoriality in connection with a famous foreign mark in the United
States—thus favoring the concept of universality in a limited context.
The Paris Convention, in Article 6bis, expressly provides an exception to
territoriality for famous marks, known as the Famous Foreign Marks
Doctrine.26 The application of, and rationale behind, Article 6bis will
also be addressed, as well as its force in the United States following the
recent Supreme Court case of Medellin v. Texas.27
What constitutes a “famous mark?” According to the text of the
Lanham Act, a trademark is “famous” when “it is widely recognized by
the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of
source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”28 For example, a
25

See Paris Convention, supra note 14.
Id.
27
Medellin v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360 (2008).
28
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006). A court may consider all relevant factors to
determine whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, including but not
limited to “(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the
duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with
which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the
mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the
channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of
recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks’
26
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consumer who sees an establishment featuring the McDonald’s Arches29
will immediately associate the establishment with hamburgers,
milkshakes, and other recognizable McDonald’s fare. The McDonald’s
trademark is indisputably “famous” under federal law.30
Consumer belief that every product bearing the same symbol
originates from the same source indicates that the symbol has the
“source-identifying property of a trademark.”31 Source-identifying
properties need not be “fanciful,” “arbitrary,” or “suggestive” words or
designs.32 A distinctive color may sufficiently identify the origin of the
good such that the color receives protection as a trademark.33 It is a
mark’s “source-distinguishing ability,” and “not its ontological status as
color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign,”34 that enables a mark to serve the
goal of “reduc[ing] the consumer’s costs of shopping and making
purchasing decisions.”35
But the McDonald’s Arches are widely known and used both inside
and outside the United States.36 McDonald’s operates over 31,000
restaurants bearing the Arches in more than 100 countries.37 What of
those trademarks that are well-known in the United States, but are not
used in the American market? Many courts have held that prior use of a
mark in the United States is a precondition to maintain a cause of action

owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of
use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was
registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the
principal register.” Id.
29
The “McDonald’s Arches” are a trademark of McDonald’s Corporation.
30
See Alexis Weissberger, Note, Is Fame Alone Sufficient To Create Priority Rights:
An International Perspective On The Viability Of The Famous/Well-Known Marks
Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739, 747 n.39 (2006).
31
Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099,
2105 (2004).
32
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995) (quoting
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1975)).
33
Id. (finding that holder’s use of a green-gold color on its press pads met the basic
requirements for trademark protection).
34
Id. at 164.
35
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 2:03.
36
See Weissberger, supra note 30, at 775 (discussing use of McDonald’s trademark
in South Africa); Michael Wallace Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad: Cultural Variations
Affecting Franchising Abroad, 9 CONN. J. INT’L L. 165, 172 (1994) (identifying the
McDonald’s golden arches as a symbol of U.S. culture). See also McDonald’s Corp. v.
McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. December 10, 1986) (describing evidence
of McDonald’s news media use and extensive advertising program relating to the “Mc”
prefix mark).
37
As of 2006, McDonald’s operated 31,046 restaurants in 118 countries. See
MCDONALD’S CORPORATION, 2006 Annual Report 22 (2007).
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for trademark infringement and dilution.38 Indeed, U.S. law establishes
trademark rights according to priority of use, not registration.39 The party
who first uses the mark generally has “priority of ownership over
conflicting claimants.”40
Two contrasting principles have developed to address the issue of
trademarks registered in one country that enter another country: (1) the
territoriality principle and (2) the universality principle.41 Historically,
the territoriality principle has governed trademark protection.42 Under
this principle, trademarks that are registered in a foreign country and
enter the home country have no priority of right over trademarks used in
the home country, even if consumers in the home country are familiar
with the foreign mark.43 A trademark is considered to have a separate
legal existence under the respective laws of each country in which it is
registered,44 and ownership of a mark in one country will not
automatically confer the exclusive right to use the mark in another
country.45 In a territoriality regime, a foreign-registered trademark will
infringe upon a domestic-registered trademark regardless of the impact
of the foreign-registered trademark in the domestic country.46
In contrast to the territoriality principle, the universality principle
focuses on the ability of the trademark to properly identify the source of
the goods to which it is affixed.47 Under the universality principle,
38

See Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). See also United States v. Steffens (Trade-Mark Cases), 100 U.S. 82
(1879); Hanover Star Milling v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565,
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998).
39
Jeffrey M. Samuels and Linda M. Samuels, A Review of Recent Decisions of The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Article: The Trademark Jurisprudence of
Judge Rich, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 761, 764 n.9 (2007). See also Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El
Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
40
Henry W. Leeds and Norm D. St. Landau, A Review of Recent Decisions of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Area Summary: Review of the 1986
Trademark Decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 36 AM. U. L. REV.
903, 913 (1987).
41
See Margo A. Bagley, Using Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to Block
Materially Different Gray Market Goods in the Common Control Context: Are Reports of
its Death Greatly Exaggerated?, 44 EMORY L.J. 1541, 1545–1546 (1995).
42
Person’s Co., 900 F.2d at 1569–70.
43
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 155 (2d Cir. 2007).
44
Stephen M. Auvil, Gray Market Goods Produced by Foreign Affiliates of the U.S.
Trademark Owner: Should the Lanham Act Provide a Remedy?, 28 AKRON L. REV. 437,
440 (1995).
45
ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 155.
46
Michael B. Weicher, Note, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.: A Black Decision for the
Gray Market, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 463, 479–80 (1989).
47
Bagley, supra note 41, at 1546.
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merchandise trademarked in one country may be transported to another
country lawfully, without the threat of infringement, so long as the
trademark accurately identifies the source of the merchandise.48 This will
be the result even if someone other than the owner of the merchandise
has an exclusive right to the trademark in the second destination
country.49 Unfortunately for proponents of universality, however, this
principle has been met with resistance in the United States.50 The
Supreme Court rejected the universality principle in 1923,51 a position
supported by concurrently enacted statutes.52
While the territoriality principle is one of the basic fundamentals of
U.S. trademark law,53 not all theorists consider the principle absolute.54
In 1959, in Vaudable v. Montmartre, New York created an exception to
the territoriality principle, reasoning that famous foreign marks deserve
protection in the United States even if they have never been used here.55
In Vaudable, restaurant proprietors in New York opened a restaurant
named “Maxim’s.” 56 A well-known, upscale restaurant by the same
name was established in Paris, France in 1893, and continues to operate
to this day.57 The owners of the Paris Maxim’s sought to enjoin operation

48

Id.
Id. See also Maureen Beyers, The Greying of American Trademarks: The Genuine
Goods Exclusion Act and the Incongruity of Customs Regulation 19 C.F.R. § 133.21, 54
FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 107 (1985).
50
See ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 155 n.14. See also Am. Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Oregon
Breakers, Inc., 406 F.3d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 2005); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F.
Supp. 1163, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Beyers, supra note 49, at 155 n.144 (asserting that
universality has been replaced with the principle of territoriality).
51
See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923); Philip Morris, Inc. v.
Allen Distribs., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (discussing impact of the
Katzel decision on trademark law).
52
See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2006). The Tariff Act of 1930 states: “Except as
provided in subsection (d) . . . it shall be unlawful to import into the United States any
merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise . . . bears a trade-mark owned
by a citizen of . . . the United States, and registered in the Patent Office . . . under the
provisions of the Act . . . unless written consent of the owner of such trade-mark is
produced at the time of making entry.” This provision gave a U.S. registered trademarkowner the right to exclude foreign goods bearing the same trademark as those registered
by the U.S. company. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
53
Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
54
See Andrew Terry and Heather Forrest, Where’s the Beef? Why Burger King is
Hungry Jack’s in Australia and Other Complications in Building a Global Franchise
Brand, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 171, 173 (2008).
55
Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959). See
also Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L.
REV. 695, 720 (1998).
56
Vaudable, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
57
Id. at 758.
49
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of the Manhattan restaurant.58 The court found that the Paris Maxim’s
mark was sufficiently famous to warrant protection in the United States59
and enjoined operation of the New York Maxim’s, despite the fact that
the owners of the Paris Maxim’s had never operated a restaurant in New
York.60 Pursuant to the exception to territoriality created in Vaudable, a
famous foreign trademark will be protected in the United States if the
mark is well-known here, even though the mark has not been “actually
used” or registered in the United States.61 This exception to the
territoriality principle is what is commonly referred to as the “Famous
Foreign Marks Doctrine.”62
Proponents of the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine rely on the Paris
Convention to support adoption of this doctrine into U.S. trademark
law.63 The drafters of the Paris Convention understood 125 years ago that
there existed some trademarks whose fame transcended the territoriality
principle. The Paris Convention, which was put in force in the United
States on May 30, 1887,64 seventy-two years before Vaudable, is perhaps
the clearest authority for establishing standards for infringement of a
well-known mark.65 Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, which serves as
a basis for universal recognition of well-known marks, provides that:
[t]he countries of the Union undertake . . . to prohibit the use[] of
a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a
translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by
the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be

58

Id. See also Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th
Cir. 2004) (discussing the fame and notoriety of the Paris Maxim’s).
59
According to the court, regarding the Paris Maxim’s, “[t]here [was] no doubt as to
its unique and eminent position as a restaurant of international fame and prestige.”
Vaudable, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
60
Vaudable, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 335–36.
61
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 29:61.
62
The standard set forth by the Supreme Court of New York in Vaudable, adopting a
famous marks exception to the territoriality principle, has never been specifically adopted
by either the New York Court of Appeals nor any intermediate New York appellate court.
This failure to recognize the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine as a legitimate common
law doctrine led the Second Circuit to explicitly decline to adopt the Famous Foreign
Marks Doctrine in a recent decision in ITC v. Punchgini. ITC v. Punchgini, 482 F.3d 135,
165 (2d Cir. 2007); see also infra Part III.
63
Paris Convention, supra note 14. The benefits of the Paris Convention are enjoyed
by each member country of the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property. Id. at art.
1–2. The Union for the Protection of Industrial Property consists of the countries to
which the Paris Convention applies. Id.
64
World Intellectual Property Organization, Treaties Database – Contracting Parties,
Paris Convention, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=334C (last
visited December 29, 2008).
65
MOSTERT, supra note 5, at 6.
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well known in that country as being already the mark of a person
entitled to the benefits of this Convention.66

Article 6bis requires that, where a person in one member country holds a
trademark that is “well-known” in another member country, the domestic
trademark-holder must not face competition in the foreign country’s
market from any product that would likely create confusion with its own
product, trademarked domestically but not in the foreign market.
In McDonalds Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant Ltd., a fastfood restaurant proprietor—Joburgers—sought to use the familiar golden
arches design and BIG MAC trademarks, as well as the McDonald’s
name, in a new chain of restaurants.67 At that time, McDonald’s had
registered several trademarks in South Africa, but had not used them.68
Despite the absence of use of any of the McDonald’s marks in South
Africa, the court found that the McDonald’s name and its principal
trademark, the golden arches, were well-known among the “portion of
persons who would be interested in the goods or services provided by
McDonald’s.”69 The court examined Joburgers’ use of the McDonald’s
trademark within the meaning of South Africa’s Trade Marks Act,70
enacted only one year prior to the commencement of the Joburgers
litigation, which gave legislative effect to the provisions of Article 6bis
of the Paris Convention.71 The court held that because the McDonald’s
trademarks were well-known, use of these marks by Joburgers would
cause deception or confusion among South Africans.72 Therefore, the
court forbade Joburgers’ use of the McDonald’s trademark in South
Africa.73
Aside from conflict-of-law issues,74 conflicts arise surrounding the
definition of the term “well-known.”75 The Paris Convention “does not
define the conditions under which a trademark is to be considered well
known” and, therefore, considerable uncertainty exists regarding the
circumstances under which the holder of a trademark may invoke the

66

See Paris Convention, supra note 14 (emphasis added).
McDonalds Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant (Pty) Ltd. 1996 (1) SA 1(A)
(S. Afr.).
68
Id. at 2.
69
Id. at 65.
70
Trade Marks Act No. 194 of 1993.
71
McDonald’s, supra note 67, at 21; Trade Marks Act No. 194 of 1993 s. 35
72
Id. at 66.
73
Id. at 75.
74
See, e.g., In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1215 (Fed Cir. 2005); Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v.
Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
75
MOSTERT, supra note 5, at 16 (advocating a “case-by-case approach” to determine
whether a mark is famous or well-known).
67
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protection of Article 6bis.76 The 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) does provide some
insight on the meaning of the term “well-known mark.” 77 TRIPS
provides that in making the determination whether a trademark is wellknown, account shall be taken “of the knowledge of the trademark in the
relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in the Member
concerned which has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the
trademark.”78
Article 6bis was designed to govern the “reputation without use”
scenario, in which a trademark pirate registers a trademark in one
country, therefore pre-empting a foreign holder of that well-known
trademark from using the mark in the country where the pirate has
registered his trademark.79 Actual use by the pirate is not required by the
Paris Convention; mere registration of the well-known trademark will
suffice to invoke the protections of Article 6bis against the pirate.80 This
approach stands in stark contrast to the U.S. rule, which requires actual
use in commerce to maintain a cause of action for infringement or
dilution under the Lanham Act.81
At least one country has encountered the issue of the use of a
famous, yet unregistered, trademark.82 In 2005, the well-known
STARBUCKS trademark had not yet been registered in Russia.83 A
Russian entrepreneur registered the STARBUCKS trademark and logo,
and immediately offered to sell use rights to the U.S. owner of the
STARBUCKS trademark for $600,000.84 While the U.S. trademark
owner prevailed in legal action against the Russian entrepreneur on
76
Id. at 17 (citing Memorandum prepared by the International Bureau (WIPO),
“Protection of Well-Known Marks: Results of the Study by The International Bureau and
Prospects for Improvement of the Existing Situation,” Committee of Experts on WellKnown Marks, Meeting in Geneva, November 13–16, 1995, at 6).
77
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
78
Id.
79
Mark D. Nielsen, Cohiba: Not Just Another Name, Not Just Another Stogie: Does
General Cigar Own a Valid Trademark for the Name “Cohiba” in the United States?, 21
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 633, 645 (1999). See also MOSTERT, supra note 5, at 19
(describing “reputation-without-use” as the scenario in which a mark was neither
registered nor used but had acquired a well-known reputation in the local jurisdiction).
80
Nielsen, supra note 79, at 645.
81
See Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326–
27 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). See also Samuels & Samuels, supra note 39, at 764 n.9.
82
See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 29:61.
83
Max Vern, A Trademark Visa—Aspects of International Trademark Use and
Protection, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 847, 850 (2006). See also MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 29:61.
84
Vern, supra note 83, at 850.
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criminal grounds,85 at least one well-known treatise on trademark
doctrine86 has cited this case as an application of the Famous Foreign
Marks Doctrine by a signatory country to the Paris Convention.87
The key principle underlying the Paris Convention is national
treatment: prohibiting a country from providing more favorable treatment
to its own citizens than to foreigners with respect to intellectual property
protection.88 A member nation must grant foreign trademark holders the
same rights that it gives to its own citizens.89 Under the standard set forth
in the Paris Convention, the treatment of a foreign holder’s mark in the
United States should not differ from the treatment of an American
holder’s mark. Thus, it would seem that the inquiry as to whether or not
the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine applies in the United States should
end with the plain language of the Paris Convention.90 If the United
States is bound by the provisions of the Paris Convention, a treaty to
which it is a party, then an exception for famous marks from the
territoriality principle seems readily apparent.91 At the time of this
publication, however, a number of courts in the United States have held
that the Paris Convention is not self-executing92 and is subordinate to the
85

Id. See also http://www.komonews.com/news/archive/4169586.html (Komo News,
Nov. 17, 2005, “Starbucks Wins Trademark Battle in Russia”); INTA Bulletin, March 15,
2006 (“Starbucks Trademark Victory in Russia”).
86
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3. McCarthy also cites a 2005 case in
which Walt Disney Enterprises successfully prevented an Iranian from registering in Iran
the MICKEY MOUSE trademark, in Farsi, along with an image of the cartoon mouse. Id.
87
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 29:61.
88
Robert J. Gutowski, Comment, The Marriage of Intellectual Property and
International Trade in the TRIPS Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in
Heaven?, 47 BUFFALO L. REV. 713, 718 (1999). Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention
provides: “Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of
industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their
respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; all without prejudice to
the rights specially provided for in this Convention.” Id. (citing Paris Convention, supra
note 14, art. 2).
89
Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43
AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 320 (2006).
90
See Paris Convention, supra note 14. The Paris Convention prohibits use in one
member country of “a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of
registration to be well known [in that country] as being already the mark of a person
entitled to the benefits of the present Convention. . . .” Id.
91
Id.
92
Section 44(b) of the Lanham Act provides that: “[a]ny person whose country of
origin is a party to any convention or treaty relating to trademarks . . . to which the
United States is also a party . . . shall be entitled to the benefits of this section under the
conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such
convention . . . in addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise
entitled by this Act.” 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2006). While potentially interpreted as an
“avenue for reliance on international norms[,]”courts and scholars have hesitated to
construe the words “to the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such
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provisions independently provided in the Lanham Act.93 In Medellin v.
Texas,94 the Supreme Court addressed the domestic effect of an
international treaty provision95 and denied domestic application of a
treaty previously assumed to be self-executing.96 The Court stated that:
“[i]t is up to Congress whether to implement obligations undertaken
under a treaty which (like this one) does not itself have the force and
effect of domestic law . . . .”97 The effect of this decision on treaty
interpretation will be debated for years to come,98 and the question of
whether the Paris Convention is considered self-executing presently
remains in considerable doubt following Medellin.
PART II: CONSUMER SEARCH COSTS
This section will address how trademark law is intended to protect
both consumers and producers, or trademark holders.99 The architects of
the Lanham Act endeavored to secure for the owner the goodwill
convention” to mean that the Paris Convention controls over the Lanham Act. The
primary reason underlying this hesitation is that the wording of Section 44 is viewed as
too ambiguous to require the somewhat far-reaching conclusion that unfair competition
under the Lanham Act should be governed by European laws of unfair competition as
provided in the Paris Convention. Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing
Foreign Law To Decide Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 52
(2005); ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 162 (2d Cir. 2007); L’Aiglon Apparel,
Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 654 (3d Cir. 1954); but see General Motors Corp.
v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 687–88 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (finding that
Congress intended to incorporate substantive rights of the Paris Convention into the
Lanham Act).
93
Int’l Cafe v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l, 252 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding
that “[a]s other courts of appeals have noted, the rights articulated in the Paris
Convention do not exceed the rights conferred by the Lanham Act. Instead, we conclude
that the Paris Convention, as incorporated by the Lanham Act, only requires ‘national
treatment.’”). See also ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 162 (holding that “[t]he Paris Convention
creates no substantive rights beyond those independently provided in the Lanham Act.”).
94
Medellin v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360 (2008).
95
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the
Vienna Convention, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820.
96
Medellin, 129 S. Ct. at 361.
97
Id.
98
Robert Greffenius, Selling Medellin: The Entourage of Litigation Surrounding the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Weight of International Court of
Justice Opinions in the Domestic Sphere, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 943, 944 (2008).
99
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademarks and The Internet: The United States’
Experience, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 931 (2007). See also S. Rep. No. 1333, at 3, reprinted
in 1946 U.S.C.A.N. 1274, 1277 (1946) (stating that the purpose of the Lanham Act is to
“protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a
particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for
and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time, and
money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its
misappropriation.”).
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associated with its trademark, prevent diversion of trade through
commercial misrepresentations, and protect the public against exposure
to confusingly similar trademarks.100 While a consumer with expert
knowledge about the products he seeks to purchase still falls within the
purview of general trademark theory,101 the principal beneficiary of
trademark law is the “ignorant, the weak, and the unwary” consumer.102
This Part addresses how protection of trademarks will protect this
“unwary” consumer by reducing his cost of searching for an item that
suits his or her needs, and how the reduction of consumer search costs
will encourage the free flow of information and thereby contribute to an
economically efficient market.
The availability of trademarks reduces the typical consumer’s cost
of locating an item that she likes based on her prior use of an item with
the same trademark.103 A trademark assures the consumer that any
product with a particular trademark originates from the same source as
any other product bearing the same mark,104 thereby encouraging the
consumer to repeatedly purchase goods that were previously
satisfactory.105 Therefore, brands serve as the “shorthand that consumers
use to guide their all important purchasing decisions.”106
By way of example, imagine a consumer who enjoys using
Listerine® mouthwash.107 That consumer will be reassured in the
knowledge that if he or she goes to the drugstore and purchases a bottle
of Listerine® mouthwash, that bottle will live up to the quality and safety
standards as a Listerine® mouthwash used on a prior occasion. The
consumer knows that all products with the Listerine® trademark come
100

S. Rep. No. 1333. See also Auvil, supra note 44, at 440.
Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910) (“The law is
not made for the protection of experts, but for the public—that vast multitude which
includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not
stop to analyze, but are governed by appearances and general impressions.”).
102
Patricia P. Bailey & Michael Pertschuk, The Law of Deception: the Past as
Prologue, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 868 n.90 (citing Von Mumm v. Frash, 56 F. 830, 839
(2d Cir. 1893)).
103
See Q Div. Records, LLC v. Q Records, No. 99–10828, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1773, at *7 n.8 (D. Mass. 2000) (stating that “[c]larity and distinction among trademarks
serves the further purpose of making it easy for consumers to find the brands they want
without inefficiently expending extra effort to search for them.”).
104
New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir.
1992).
105
Frank I. Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 818 (1927).
106
SCOTT M. DAVIS, BRAND ASSET MANAGEMENT: DRIVING PROFITABLE GROWTH
THROUGH YOUR BRANDS 141 (Jossey-Bass 2002) (“This shorthand relieves consumers
from enduring the mentally exhausting and unsure process of trying a new brand.”).
107
Listerine® is a registered trademark of Johnson & Johnson Healthcare Products
Division of McNEIL-PPC, Inc.
101
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from the same source.108 Similarly, the producer of Listerine® will enjoy
the ability to draw this particular consumer to its product by merely
placing a recognizable name and/or trade symbol on its product
packaging. The time saved by the consumer to locate a suitable product,
without having to inefficiently expend extra effort and evaluate the
product choices in a store, is an example of a reduction in consumer
search costs.109
Trademarks contribute to economic efficiency by reducing
consumer search costs, which is often cited as the principal goal of
trademark law.110 There are several benefits conferred on both consumers
and producers by such a cost reduction.111 A trademark permits a
consumer to “know[] at a glance whose brand he is being asked to buy[,]
whom to hold responsible if the brand disappoints[,] and whose product
to buy in the future if the brand pleases.”112 Successful trademarks serve
as a “shorthand indicator” of the provenance and qualities of a particular
good113 and provide the consumer with a “packet of information” with
which to make a consumption decision.114 Accordingly, an increase in
the supply of information about a good corresponds with a decrease in
the marginal cost of such information. As the cost of information
decreases, demand for the information increases. This results in a betterinformed consumer clientele and, ultimately, a more competitive
market.115
Producers also reap substantial benefits from the existence of
trademark protection. Trademark law enables a producer to invest in the
development of a high quality product and rest securely in the knowledge
that a producer of a similar, yet lower quality, product cannot free-ride
on the high quality producer’s goodwill.116 Without a guarantee that a
108

New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 305 n.2.
Q Div. Records, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1773, at *7 n.8.
110
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1987).
111
Carter, supra note 19, at 762; see also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th
Cir. 2002).
112
Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 510.
113
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on
the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 787 (2004).
114
See Carter, supra note 19, at 759.
115
Id.
116
“High quality producer goodwill” refers to the higher costs incurred by a producer
to develop a high quality product than those incurred in producing a lower quality
product. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 113, at 787. While protection of producer
goodwill is of significant importance, this protection is not absolute. If protection of a
trademark would inhibit competition, the interest in preserving a competitive marketplace
will prevail. Carter, supra note 19, at 792. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305
U.S. 111, 121–22 (1938) (permitting Kellogg to produce cereal in a “pillow-shape” form
109
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competing firm cannot produce a duplicate product at the same marginal
cost, a production firm is unlikely to expend resources on developing a
new product or improving the quality of an existing product.117 Because
trademark law prevents another firm from copying a source-identifying
mark, a producer who holds a trademark for a product is thus assured that
it “will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a
desirable product.”118 Trademarks protect a producer from free-riding by
a lower quality producer because a trademark enables the consumer to
recognize a brand and associate a level of quality with that particular
brand.119 If the consumer lacked the ability to distinguish between brands
of a similar product, e.g. shampoo, producers of luxury shampoo would
lack incentive to develop a costlier, higher quality product than the
generic brand of shampoo sold in the drugstore.120
Professor Robert G. Bone likens this phenomenon to Akerlof’s
“lemons” model.121 Akerlof’s research focused on asymmetry of
information.122 A purchaser of a used car who has no way to determine
whether or not the car is a “lemon” (a car of little or no value) will
subsequently discount the value of all used cars available in the
market.123 When the typical used car consumer cannot distinguish high
quality from junk, this has a negative effect on sellers of high quality
used cars.124 Returning to the shampoo example above, without reliable
trademarks, the shampoo aisle would simply carry bottles containing
varying types and quality of shampoo, but a consumer would have
absolutely no method by which to distinguish a bottle of luxury Frédéric

and with the descriptive name “Shredded Wheat,” even though this would allow Kellogg
to share the goodwill of the cereal’s original creator, National Biscuit Co. The Court gave
Kellogg this right because it found that allowing Kellogg to share in the goodwill of the
unprotected Shredded Wheat trademark would reduce production costs and maintain high
quality products, goals in which the overall consuming public is deeply interested).
117
Landes & Posner, supra note 110, at 270. Contrary to popular belief, trademark
law does not seek to encourage development of a brand as a stand-alone entity. See
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 113, at 801 n.93. Trademark law protects brand
development only to the extent that use of that branded mark will reduce consumer search
costs. Id.
118
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (quoting 1
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, § 2:03 (3d ed. 1994)).
119
Bone, supra note 31, at 2108.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
123
Id.
124
The standard for the typical consumer is the “ignorant, the weak, and the unwary.”
Bailey & Pertschuk, supra note 102, at 868 n.90 (citing Von Mumm v. Frash, 56 F. 830,
839 (2d Cir. 1893)).
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Fekkai shampoo125 from a bottle of generic store brand shampoo. When a
consumer possesses no ability to distinguish between products, a luxury
goods producer such as Frédéric Fekkai has no incentive to create a
brand with higher quality characteristics.126 The result is economic
inefficiency.127
Fortunately, trademarks encourage the flow of information in
markets.128 The goal of trademark law is to “promote rigorous, truthful
competition in the marketplace.”129 Modern trademark theory posits that
trademark law is designed to prevent an increase in consumer search
costs.130 This idea is easily illustrated through a brief review of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (the “FTDA”).131 Courts require four
main elements to establish a claim of trademark dilution: (1) whether
plaintiff’s mark is famous and distinctive; (2) whether defendant’s mark
was used in commerce; (3) whether defendant’s use occurred after
plaintiff’s mark became famous; and (4) whether defendant’s use caused
dilution of plaintiff’s mark.132 A senior user of a trademark—a user who
has achieved priority of use—whose mark has been diluted loses
incentive to improve its brand image.133 Further, as a consumer’s ability
to distinguish between products declines, a producer’s desire and
motivation to improve or develop its brand similarly declines.134 In turn,
this imposes costs on the consumer because the consumer must now
exert more effort to locate the product he or she desires.135 Imagine a
restaurant that uses the “Tiffany” name, which is typically associated
with Tiffany & Co. jewelers.136 While use of the “Tiffany” name does
not confuse the public into thinking it is encountering an establishment
of Tiffany jewelers, it does weaken the “efficacy of the name as an
identifier of the store . . . . Consumers will have to think harder—incur as
125

The Frédéric & Company website touts its hair product collection as “the ultimate
in luxury hair care.” Frédéric Fekkai, http://www.fredericfekkai.com/about/ (last visited
December 29, 2008).
126
See Bone, supra note 31, at 2108.
127
Id.
128
David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 22, 27 (2006); see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 113, at 787.
129
Barnes, supra note 128, at 27.
130
Id. at 49.
131
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Pub. L. No. 104–98, 109 Stat. 985
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 1125(c), 1127 (2006)).
132
Lee Goldman, Proving Dilution, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 569, 571–72 (2004). While
there is consensus regarding the elements themselves, there is significant disagreement
among courts as to the interpretation and application of these elements. Id.
133
Id. at 575.
134
See Bone, supra note 31, at 2108.
135
See Goldman, supra note 132, at 575.
136
Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002).
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it were a higher imagination cost—to recognize the name as the name of
the store.”137 Trademarks alleviate the need for consumers to “think
harder” in order to determine whether the good or service is one they
want to purchase. The availability of a trademark on a product
immediately provides the consumer with information about the good’s
origin and quality, which reduces the consumer’s cost of searching for
suitable goods. Reducing the consumer’s search costs also reduces the
producer’s cost of marketing and locating a suitable consumer for its
products. By lowering costs for both consumers and producers, the
overall goals of trademark law to promote an efficient market and reduce
consumer search costs can be achieved.
PART III: CIRCUIT SPLIT
The question of whether a famous foreign mark, registered abroad
but not registered in the United States, should receive trademark
protection under the Lanham Act138 remains uncertain following a circuit
split between the Second and Ninth Circuits.139 The Second Circuit has
explicitly declined to extend protection to a foreign mark that is famous
but not registered in the United States.140 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit
has developed a two-part test that would provide protection, in limited
circumstances, to a famous unregistered mark in the United States.141
Ninth Circuit: Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co.
Grupo Gigante is of particular importance because it represents the
first application of a famous marks exception to the territoriality
principle by a circuit court.142 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Ninth
Circuit did not base its decision in Grupo Gigante on strict statutory
interpretation; instead, the court identified compelling policy reasons to
carve out an exception to the territoriality principle.143 In Grupo Gigante,
137

Id.
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (creating a civil cause of action for
likelihood of confusion); see id. § 1125(c) (allowing a cause of action for injunctive relief
to the owner of a famous mark).
139
Compare ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007), with Grupo
Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
140
ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 135.
141
Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1098.
142
Jeffrey M. Samuels and Linda B. Samuels, Recent Developments in U.S.
Trademark Law: A Confusing State of Affairs, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 361,
371 (April 2006); See also Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094 (noting that “[t]here is no
circuit-court authority—from this or any other circuit—applying a famous-mark
exception to the territoriality principle.”).
143
Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094 (finding that “[a]n absolute territoriality rule
without a famous-mark exception would promote consumer confusion and fraud . . . .
138
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a Mexican company operated a chain of “Gigante” supermarkets on the
United States-Mexico border.144 Nearly forty years after the creation of
the Mexican Gigante chain, the defendant opened a grocery store in the
San Diego area called “Gigante Market.”145 When Grupo Gigante sought
to expand its operations into the United States, a battle ensued between
Grupo Gigante and defendant Dallo regarding which party had
established priority of use.146
The Ninth Circuit held that the territoriality principle, which grants
“priority of trademark rights in the United States . . . solely upon priority
of use in the United States, not on priority of use anywhere in the world,”
should not be absolute.147 The court created a two-part test to determine
whether a mark is sufficiently famous to receive protection.148 First, the
mark must satisfy the secondary meaning requirement.149 To obtain
trademark registration under the Lanham Act, unless a mark is
“fanciful,” “arbitrary,” or “suggestive,” the user must present proof that
the mark has acquired secondary meaning.150 Broadly speaking, a mark
has acquired secondary meaning when, “in the minds of the public, [its]
primary significance . . . is to identify the source of the product rather
than the product itself.”151 For example, initially, the term “Teddy
Graham” brings to mind a physical description of the product itself—a
graham cracker biscuit in the shape of a teddy bear.152 Only when the
term “Teddy Graham” can evoke in the collective mind of the public a
specific good “produced or sponsored by a particular person”153—in the
case of the Teddy Graham, a product by Kraft Foods Inc.154—has the

There can be no justification for using trademark law to fool immigrants into thinking
that they are buying from the store they liked back home.”).
144
Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1091.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 1092–93.
147
Id. at 1093 (quoting MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 29:2)
(emphasis added), contra Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 103–05 (2d Cir.
1998) (adopting a strict application of the territoriality principle and refusing to consider
earlier use in another country as a factor to determine priority of use).
148
Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1096.
149
Id.
150
Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1806 (2007). See also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976).
151
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (citing Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851, n.11 (1982)).
152
Desai & Rierson, supra note 150, at 1808.
153
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(a), (b) (1995)).
154
See Kraft Foods Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 26, 2008).
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term achieved the secondary meaning necessary to qualify for trademark
registration in the United States.155
The Ninth Circuit enumerated certain non-dispositive factors that
may establish secondary meaning, including: direct consumer testimony;
survey evidence; exclusivity, manner, and length of use of a mark;
amount and manner of advertising; amount of sales and number of
customers; established place in the market; and proof of intentional
copying by the defendant.156 The mark must be distinctive enough to
warrant protection, and the plaintiff’s geographical use of the mark must
be widespread enough such that the mark has gained secondary meaning
not only within the area in which it has been used, but also within a
“remote” area where a subsequent user claims a right to use the mark.157
The second step of the Ninth Circuit test to receive protection under the
Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine requires a plaintiff to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that, when the mark has not previously
been used in the U.S. market, a “substantial percentage of consumers in
the relevant American market is familiar with the foreign mark.”158
Grupo Gigante did not explicitly identify consumer search cost
theory as the rationale for permitting a limited application of the Famous
Foreign Marks Doctrine, but the benefits of the holding with respect to
search costs can be gleaned from a brief examination of the policy points
explicitly stated in the opinion. According to the Ninth Circuit,
“[t]rademark is, at its core, about protecting against consumer
confusion.”159 The court used the example of a high-end salon in
Australia with a red door called “Elizabeth Arden’s,” with no affiliation
to the chain of Red Door Spas operated in the United States and Europe
by Elizabeth Arden Spas, LLC.160 Consumers in Australia seeking spa
treatment would likely visit “Elizabeth Arden’s,” thinking that it was an
affiliate of Red Door Spas, only to discover later that the quality of
155

Id.
Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1151
(9th Cir. 1999). See also 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 15:30.
157
Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 2004).
158
Id. at 1098 (emphasis added). The court suggested that (i) intentional copying by
the defendant and (ii) the likelihood that customers of the American company will think
they are patronizing the firm that uses the mark in a different country would be relevant
factors in determining the sufficiency of the familiarity of American consumers with the
foreign mark. Id.
159
Id. at 1094. See also Thane Int’l v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding that “[t]he question whether an alleged trademark infringer’s use of a
mark creates a likelihood that the consuming public will ‘be confused as to who makes
what’ product is therefore the ‘core element’ of trademark infringement law.”).
160
Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094–95; Red Door Spas – About Us,
http://www.reddoorspas.com/aboutus.aspx (last visited December 29, 2008).
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treatment differed substantially from that of the American/European Red
Door Spas.161
The court focused on the detrimental effect such consumer
confusion would have on the producer, Elizabeth Arden,162 but the harm
caused would be no less severe for the consumer. Once the consumer is
unable to rely on the “Elizabeth Arden” mark to deliver the level of
quality which she associates with salons bearing that name, her costs of
finding a suitable salon in the future will increase. Should this effect
continue, the increase in costs to consumers could ultimately undermine
consumers’ faith and reliance on the current system in which trademarks
serve as a “shorthand indicator” of a particular good or service’s
provenance and quality.163 The result would be a market in which
trademarks carried little or no meaning, and would resemble a market in
which trademarks did not exist at all.
Second Circuit: ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.
The Second Circuit expressed its adherence to the territoriality
principle in its recent decision in ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.164 In ITC
Ltd., the plaintiff owned the internationally renowned “Bukhara”
restaurant chain based in New Delhi, India.165 The plaintiff brought a
claim for trademark infringement against the defendants, previous
employees of the New Delhi Bukhara, who had opened a restaurant in
Manhattan named “Bukhara Grill.”166 The plaintiff alleged that
defendants utilized logos, décor, staff uniforms and menus in the
Manhattan Bukhara Grill that were strikingly similar to those already in
use in the famous New Delhi Bukhara restaurant chain.167 The court
found that the plaintiff did not have priority rights to the mark under
Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, holding instead that “absent
some use of its mark in the United States, a foreign mark holder
generally may not assert priority rights under federal law, even if a U.S.
competitor has knowingly appropriated that mark for his own use.”168
161

Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094.
Id.
163
See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 113, at 787 (referring to trademarks as
“shorthand indicators.”).
164
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d. Cir. 2007).
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 143.
168
Id. at 155–56. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). The Court of Appeals of
New York, in its review of a question certified to it by the Second Circuit in ITC Ltd.,
had determined that, for a mark to be considered famous, “at a minimum, consumers of
the good or service provided under [the] mark . . . must primarily associate the mark with
the foreign plaintiff.” ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 9 N.Y.3d 467, 479 (N.Y. 2007).
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The Second Circuit concluded that Congress has not yet adopted
the idea that continued international use of a mark leads to a federally
protected right under the Lanham Act, and found persuasive the fact that
no provision of the Lanham Act or other federal law recognizes a famous
marks exception to the territoriality principle.169 Further, the court found
that the absence of statutory discourse addressing the issue was not
merely an unintentional omission by Congress.170 Instead, the court
reasoned that the Lanham Act’s specificity in detailing circumstances
under which the holder of a foreign registered mark can claim priority
rights, and the absence of a discussion of a famous marks exception in
specific detail, suggested an intention on the part of Congress to exclude
a famous marks exception from the scope of the Lanham Act.171
As a result of the absence of statutory authority governing a famous
marks exception, the Second Circuit stated that “[b]efore we construe the
Lanham Act to include such a significant departure from the principle of
territoriality, we will wait for Congress to express its intent more
clearly.”172 This holding rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Grupo
Gigante,173 as well as numerous decisions of the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board.174 The Second Circuit voiced its concern that none of
these aforementioned decisions referenced the Lanham Act, the Paris
Convention, or any other federal law in support of their findings of a
famous foreign marks exception.175
In sum, the Second Circuit has declined to recognize the Famous
Foreign Marks Doctrine and has adopted a strict statutory approach to
the issue of famous foreign marks. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit
has approached the issue from a public policy standpoint, and has
provided protection to famous, unregistered marks in certain
circumstances. This lack of clarity among the circuits with regard to U.S.
law on famous foreign trademarks is confusing for consumers.
169
ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 142, 159 (citing the absence of reliance on the Lanham Act
or other federal law in three recent Trademark Board decisions recognizing the Famous
Foreign Marks Doctrine). See In Mother’s Rests., Inc. v. Mother’s Other Kitchen, Inc.,
218 U.S.P.Q. 1046 (T.T.A.B. 1983); All England Lawn Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Creative
Aromatiques, 220 U.S.P.Q. 1069 (T.T.A.B. 1983); First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v.
First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1334 (T.T.A.B. 2005), overruled on other
grounds by First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc., No. 06–
1202, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 367 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
170
ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 163–64.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 164.
173
Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
174
See, e.g., In Mother’s Rests., 218 U.S.P.Q. at *13–14; All England Lawn Tennis
Club, 220 U.S.P.Q. at *10–11; First Niagara Ins. Brokers, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at *30–31.
175
ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 158–60.
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Establishing a uniform approach to the issue is necessary in order to
maintain the United States’s position as an attractive market for foreign
producers to enter.
PART IV: ADOPTING THE FAMOUS FOREIGN MARKS DOCTRINE
The principle of territoriality has become outdated in the modern
world where technology is pervasive and consumers freely travel
between domestic and foreign markets with ever-increasing frequency.
Adopting the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine would permit consumers
and producers alike to benefit from reduced search costs. Failure to
recognize famous marks that are deeply ingrained and widespread in
American society would be detrimental to commerce, and Congress must
take action to ensure Americans benefit from the protection of these
famous marks.
The territoriality principle initially gained prevalence because
theorists felt that the alternative—the universality principle—was based
on “an idealistic view of the world as a single marketplace.”176 While
global commerce still does not operate as a single cohesive entity, the
reputation of a product or service now travels at rapid speeds.177 Often, a
product can reach a foreign market long before the trademark owner has
had the opportunity to market the product and “actually use” its
trademark in the foreign market.178 As a result of the increased speed at
which trade flows, at least one federal court has noted that “[r]ecognition
of the famous marks doctrine is particularly desirable in a world where
international travel is commonplace and where the Internet and other
media facilitate the rapid creation of business goodwill that transcends
borders.”179 The increase in international foot traffic, combined with the
advent of the Internet as a legitimate marketplace, demonstrates that the
issue of famous foreign marks can no longer be ignored.180 Put simply, it
is no longer fair to say that a mark used abroad is not sufficiently wellknown to U.S. consumers. The current state of the law—that use in the
United States of a mark used and well-known abroad does not give rise
176

Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World Of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998).
178
Id.
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De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc., 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9307, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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For example, “[t]oday, on the Internet, consumers order their favorite pasta sauce
from Italy, gamble online in casinos in Monaco, invest in the Taiwanese stock market via
a Hong Kong stock broker, or make hotel reservations in Florida.” Bosling, Thies,
Securing Trademark in a Global Economy — The United States’ Accession to the Madrid
Protocol, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 137, 165 (2004).
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to a claim for trademark infringement — is unjustified and a hindrance to
global trade.
In addition to being anachronistic, failure to recognize famous
foreign marks significantly increases costs for consumers. In selecting a
good for purchase, consumers effectively pay two costs: (1) the price of
the good charged by the vendor and (2) the cost of gathering information
about the product.181 Protecting famous foreign marks will reduce
consumer search costs because protection will eliminate consumers’
apprehension that trademarks consistent within the United States may not
be consistent worldwide. Imagine a businessman who, during the course
of a business trip to Italy, discovers a brand of shaving cream he truly
enjoys. Without the existence of protection for famous marks via the
Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine, the businessman must question
whether the product he encounters in his corner drugstore in Chicago
originates from the same source as a product with an identical mark he
enjoyed in Italy.182 His costs of locating a good that he knows will satisfy
his needs increase when he cannot rely upon the mark with which he
became familiar in Italy.
This predicament will not only increase the businessman’s costs,
but it will open the door for a producer marketing goods in the United
States to free-ride on the goodwill of the Italian producer’s trademark.183
Threatened by the prospect of free-riding producers in America, the
Italian producer has two courses of action. The Italian producer might
cease product development, seeing no direct benefit from developing a
higher quality product that will receive no recognition in the U.S. market.
Alternatively, it will launch an attempt to gain registration and priority in
the United States, the cost of which will likely translate into higher prices
for consumers.184 In either scenario, the consumer and the producer are
inefficiently expending extra effort to connect the needs of the former
with the supply of the latter. This produces a result contrary to the
intended purpose of trademarks—to reduce the search costs of the
consumer and promote a more competitive, efficient market.185
Recognizing the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine will ultimately
reduce consumer search costs. In terms of effect on the consumer, the
benefits from protecting famous foreign marks in the United States equal
181
Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial Interest Confusion, Search Costs,
and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 SEATTLE L. REV. 97, 109 (2004).
182
See, e.g., Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094.
183
See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121 (1938).
184
Landes & Posner, supra note 110, at 266–70.
185
See Q Div. Records, LLC v. Q Records, No. 99–10828, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1773, at *7 n.8 (D. Mass. 2000); Carter, supra note 19, at 759.
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the benefits provided by protection of registered trademarks. If a famous
marks exception is explicitly adopted by Congress, a consumer faced
with a recognizable mark abroad could confidently rely on prior
experience with goods bearing that mark, in lieu of conducting a
thorough examination of the quality of the marked goods. The consumer
would be able to say to himself: “I need not investigate the attributes of
the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand
way of telling me that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I
enjoyed earlier [in a foreign country].”186 This level of security in making
consumption decisions will reduce the consumer’s overall costs of
searching for a suitable good to meet his needs. Because the consumer
will be armed with a more complete arsenal of information about the
product he is poised to purchase, communicated to him via the mark
affixed to the product, his marginal cost of acquiring information about
the product will correspondingly decrease.187 This, in turn, will result in a
more competitive market in which the risk of consumer confusion has
been substantially minimized.188
CONCLUSION
The principal goal of trademark law is to reduce consumer search
costs.189 In this modern age of globalization, isolationism of trademark
recognition no longer serves American consumers.190 The preservation of
our global trading system through prevention of unfair exploitation of
famous marks has become essential.191 If a consumer is satisfied with his
use of a trademarked product in a foreign country, why should he not
expect that a similarly trademarked product found in the United States
186

Landes & Posner, supra note 110, at 269.
Carter, supra note 19, at 759.
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Id. See also Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Société Des Bains De Mer Et Du Cercle Des
Etrangers à Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 381 (4th Cir. 2003) (remarking that protecting a
famous foreign mark would further the “ultimate end of all trademark law”—that is,
avoidance of consumer confusion).
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Landes & Posner, supra note 110, at 268–70; Carter, supra note 19, at 762. See
also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 113, at 795 (noting that “the view of trademark
enforcement as reducing consumer search costs is well-known in the economic
literature.”).
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The Supreme Court has recognized that application of U.S. trademark laws outside
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Symposium, Intellectual Property Online: The Challenge of Multi-Territorial Disputes,
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S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004)).
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carries the same qualities and characteristics as the product found earlier
in the foreign country? It cannot be said with much sincerity that a
consumer exposed to a trademark abroad will never enter the U.S.
marketplace. Over one million people enter the United States as legal
permanent residents each year,192 and tens of millions arrive as
nonimmigrant admissions.193 Further, millions of U.S. citizens and
permanent residents travel to and from the country on a regular basis.
Thus, the search costs of the consumer who shops both abroad and in the
United States are significantly increased by the absence of a statutory
Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine. The worldly U.S. consumer can no
longer rely on the consistent quality of international trademarks.
The future of the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine lies in the hands
of Congress. Incorporation of this doctrine into the Lanham Act would
ensure that the reduction of consumer search costs remains the primary
objective of trademark law. This goal should not obstructed by an
unwillingness to part with an outdated conception of the global economy.
Congress should eliminate the burden of high search costs imposed on
consumers resulting from lack of protection for famous marks and
consider an amendment to the Lanham Act that would sufficiently
protect famous foreign marks.

192
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
UNITED STATES, YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS: 2006 5 (2007).
193
Id. at 66–67. The Yearbook of Immigration Statistics defines “nonimmigrant
admissions” as “arrivals of persons who are authorized to stay in the United States for a
limited period of time.” Id. at 1.

